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Abstract. Networked systems are ubiquitous in today’s world with examples spanning from ecol-
ogy to the social and engineering sciences. Much of the research in networked systems is analytical,
where the focus is on characterizing (and potentially influencing) the emergent collective behav-
ior, e.g., predicting the distribution of animals and humans in a given ecological system. A more
recent trend of research focuses on the design of networked systems capable of achieving diverse
and highly coordinated collective behavior in the absence of centralized control, e.g., designing
a team of unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor the perimeter of a wild fire. Unfortunately, our
understanding of how microscopic behavior impacts the macroscopic phenomena in network sys-
tems is inadequate for meeting the demands of this emerging design task. This paper focuses on
an instance of this design task for a well-studied class of coverage problems where the goal is to
allocate a collection of agents to a subset of resources in order to maximize the cumulative value of
the covered resources. Our first result demonstrates that any agent-based algorithm relying solely
on local information induces a fundamental trade-off between the best and worst case performance
guarantees, as measured by the price of anarchy and price of stability. This result highlights how the
information available to the agents translates to constraints on the achievable efficiency guarantees
in networked control systems. Our second results demonstrates how to use an additional piece of
system-level information to breach these limitations, thereby improving the system’s performance.
1 Introduction
A multiagent system can be characterized by a collection of individual subsystems, each mak-
ing independent decisions in response to locally available information. Such a decision-making
architecture can either emerge naturally as the results of self-interested behavior, e.g., drivers
in a transportation network, or be the result of a design choice in engineered system. In the
latter case, the need for distributed decision-making stems from the scale, spatial distribution,
and sheer quantity of information associated with various problem domains that exclude the
possibility for centralized decision making and control. One concrete example is the problem of
monitoring the perimeter of a wild fire, where the goal is to deploy a collection of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV) to effectively survey the perimeter of a wild fire under the operational con-
straint that each UAV makes independent surveillance decisions in response to local information
regarding its own aerial view of the landscape and minimal information regarding the state of
neighboring UAVs [1]. Alternative examples include the use of robotic networks in post-disaster
environments [20, 16], task scheduling and management [8], water conservative food production
[18], fleets of autonomous vehicles [33], micro-scale medical treatments [32, 15], among others.
Regardless of the specific problem domain, the central goal in the design of a networked
control system is to derive admissible control policies for the decision-making entities that ensure
the emergent collective behavior is desirable with regards to a given system-level objective. At
a high level, this design process entails specifying two key elements: the information available
to each subsystem, attained either through sensing or communication, and a decision-making
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mechanism that prescribes how each subsystem processes available information to take decisions.
The quality of a networked control architecture is ultimately gauged by several dimensions
including the stability and efficacy of the emergent collective behavior, characteristics of the
transient behavior, in addition to communication costs associated with propagating information
throughout the system. The focus of this paper is on the following two questions associated with
the design of networked control systems.
(i) What are the decision-making rules that optimize the performance of the emergent collective
behavior for a given level of informational availability?
(ii) What is the value of information in networked control architectures? That is, how does
informational availability translate to attainable performance guarantees for the emergent
behavior through the design of appropriate decision-making mechanisms?
This paper seeks to shed light on the answer to these two questions in a class of multiagent
set covering problems introduced in [13]. In a multiagent set covering problem we are given
a ground set of resources, and n collections of subsets of the ground set. Every resource is
associated with a respective value or worth. The system-level objective is to select one set from
each collection so as to maximize the total value of covered elements.
If the n collections of subsets coincide (i.e. if we reduce to the max-n-coverage problem,
[30]), there are well-established centralized algorithms that can derive an admissible allocation
of agents to resources that is within a factor of 1−1/e of the optimal allocation’s value in poly-
nomial time [31, 30, 11, 19]. No polynomial time algorithm can provide a better approximation,
unless P = NP. Unfortunately, the applicability of such centralized algorithms for the control
of multiagent systems is limited given the concerns highlighted above. Hence, in this paper
we consider distributed approaches for reaching a near-optimal allocation where the individual
agents make their covering selections in response to locally available information accordingly to
a designed decision-making policy. The central goal here is to design agent decision-making rules
that optimize the quality of the emergent collective behavior for a given level of informational
availability. Of specific interest will be identifying how the level of information available to the
individual agents impacts the attainable performance guarantees associated with the designed
networked control system.
In the spirit of [13, 26], we approach this problem through a game theoretic lens where we
model the individual agents as players in a game and each agent is associated with a local objec-
tive function that guides its decision-making process. We treat these local objective functions as
our design parameter and focus our analysis on characterizing the performance guarantees as-
sociated with the resulting equilibria of the designed game. The justification for focusing purely
on equilibria, derives from the fact that there is a rich body of literature in distributed learning
that could be coupled with the derived objective functions to attain distributed algorithms that
lead the collective behavior to an equilibrium, c.f., [12, 3]. We concentrate our analysis on two
well-studied performance metrics in the game theoretic literature termed the price of anarchy
and price of stability [2, 17]. Informally, the price of anarchy provides performance guarantees
associated with the worst performing equilibrium relative to the optimal allocation. The price
of stability, on the other hand, provides similar performance guarantees when restricting atten-
tion to the best performing equilibrium. The lack of uniqueness of equilibria implies that these
bounds are often quite different.
The work of [13] was one of the first to view price of anarchy as a design objective rather
than its more traditional counterpart as an analytical tool. The main results in [13] identify
a set of agent objective functions that optimize the price of anarchy when agents are only
aware of (i) the resources the agent can select and (ii) the number of agents covering these
resources. Note that in this setting, any agent i is unaware of the covering options of any other
agents j 6= i, as well as any resource values that the agent is unable to cover. Interestingly, [13]
demonstrate that this optimal price of anarchy attains the same 1− 1/e guarantees of the best
centralized algorithms (even when the n collections of subsets are different), meaning that there
is no degradation in terms of the worst-case efficiency guarantees when transitioning from the
best centralized algorithm to the presented distributed algorithm that adheres to the prescribed
informational limitations.
Our Contribution. A networked control architecture is ultimately gauged by several dimen-
sions, and worst-case metrics, such as the price of anarchy, are obviously one of these dimensions.
The first main question we address in this manuscript is whether utilizing the agent objective
functions that optimize the price of anarchy has any unintended consequences with regards to
other performance metrics of interest. The response is in the affirmative, as detailed in our first
main theorem.
– In Theorem 1, we demonstrate that there is a fundamental trade-off between the price of
anarchy and price of stability in such multiagent covering problems. That is, designing agent
objective functions to improve the price of anarchy necessarily degrades the price of stability.
As corner cases, any objective functions that ensure a price of anarchy of 1−1/e also inherit
a price of stability of 1 − 1/e. Note that having a price of stability < 1 implies that the
optimal allocation is not necessarily an equilibrium. Alternatively, any objective functions
that ensure a price of stability of 1 also inherit a price of anarchy of at most 1/2. This
theorem characterizes the price of anarchy and price of stability frontier that is achievable
through the design of agent objective functions in these multiagent covering problem.
The second main result of this manuscript focuses on the impact of information on the
performance guarantees associated with the optimal agent objective functions that exploit the
underlying informational availability. Theorem 1 demonstrates that there is a price of anarchy
and price of stability frontier when agents are only aware of (i) the resources the agent can select
and (ii) the number of agents covering these resources. The following theorem demonstrates that
one can move beyond this frontier by providing the agents with additional information about
the system at large.
– In Theorem 5, we identify a minimal (and easily attainable) piece of system-level information
that can permit the realization of decision-making rules with performance guarantees beyond
the price of anarchy / price of stability frontier provided in Theorem 1. When agents are
provided with this additional information, which can be vaguely interpreted as the largest
value of an uncovered resource in the system, one can derive agent objective function that
yield a price of anarchy of 1 − 1/e and a price of stability of 1, which was unattainable
without this additional piece of information.
It is important to stress that the specific make-up of this information is not necessarily im-
portant; rather, the importance of this result centers on the fact that certain attributes of the
system can be exploited in networked architectures if those attributes are propagated to the
agents. Minimizing the amount of information that needs to be propagated throughout the sys-
tem to move beyond the frontier is clearly an important question that warrants future attention.
Lastly, to highlight the significance of Theorem 5, it is important to highlight that even setting
agents objective functions as the system-level objective is not sufficient to overcome the frontier
established in Theorem 1.
Related Work. The results contained in this manuscript add to the growing literature of utility
design, which can be interpreted as a subfield of mechanism design [7] where the objective is
to design admissible agent objective functions to optimize various performance metrics, such as
the price of anarchy and price of stability, [21, 27, 5]. While recent work in [14] has identified
all design approaches that ensure equilibrium existence in local utility designs, in general the
question of optimizing the efficiency of the resulting equilibria, i.e., optimizing the price of
anarchy, is far less understood. Nonetheless, there are a few positive results in this domain worth
reviewing. Beyond [13], alternative problem domains where optimizing the price of anarchy has
been explored include concave cost sharing games [24], reverse carpooling games [23], among
others. The bulk of the research regarding optimal utility design has concentrated on a specific
class of objectives, termed budget-balanced objectives, which imposes the constraint that the sum
of the agents’ objectives is equal to the system welfare for every allocation. Within the confines
of budget-balanced agent objective functions, several works have identified the optimality of
the Shapley value objective design with regards to the price of anarchy guarantees [9, 10, 6].
However, the imposition of this budget-balanced constraint is unwarranted in the context of
multiagent system design and its removal allows for improved performance, as shown in [13]
and in this manuscript.
Organization. In section 2 we introduce the multiagent coverage problem and corresponding
performance metrics. In section 3 we present the trade-off between price of anarchy and stability.
In section 4 we show how to breach this trade-off by leveraging an additional piece of system-level
information.
Notation. We use N, R>0 and R≥0 to denote the set of natural, positive and non negative real
numbers; e is Euler’s number.
2 Model and Performance Metrics
In this section we introduce the multiagent set covering problem and our game theoretic model
for the design of local decision-making mechanisms [13]. Further, we define the objectives and
performance metrics of interest, as well as provide a review of the relevant literature.
2.1 Covering problems
Let R = {r1, r2, . . . , rm} be a finite set of resources where each resource r ∈ R is associated
with a value vr ≥ 0 defining its importance. We consider a covering problem where the goal
is to allocate a collection of agents N = {1, . . . , n} to resources in R in order to maximize
the cumulative value of the covered resources. The set of possible assignments for each agent
i ∈ N is given by Ai ⊆ R and we express an allocation by the tuple a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ A =
A1 × · · · × An. The total value, or welfare, associated with an allocation a is given by
W (a) =
∑
r∈∪i∈Nai
vr.
The goal of the covering problem is to find an optimal allocation, i.e., an allocation aopt ∈ A
such that W (aopt) ≥ W (a) for all a ∈ A.We will express an allocation a as (ai, a−i) with the
understanding that a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an) denotes the collection of choices of the
agents other than agent i.
2.2 A game theoretic model
This paper focuses on deriving distributed mechanisms for attaining near optimal solutions to
covering problem where the individual agents make independent covering choices in response
to local available information. Specifically, in this section we assume that each agent i has
information only regarding the resources that the agent can select, i.e., the resources Ai ⊆ R.
Rather than directly specifying a decision-making process, here we focus on the design of local
agent objective functions that adhere to these informational dependencies and will ultimately
be used to guide the agents’ selection process. To that end, we consider the framework of
distributed welfare games [26] where each agent is associated with a local utility or objective
function Ui : A → R and for any allocation a = (ai, a−i) ∈ A, the utility of agent i is
Ui(ai = r, a−i) = vr · f(|a|r), (1)
where |a|r captures the number of agents that choose resource r in the allocation a, i.e. the
cardinality of the set {i ∈ N : ai = r}, and f : N→ R defines the fractional benefit awarded to
each agent for selecting a given resource in allocation a. We will refer to f as the distribution rule
throughout. Note that an agent’s utility function in (1) is consistent with the local information
available as it only depends on the resource that the agent selected, the number of agents that
also selected this resource, as well as the distribution rule f and relevant resource value vr
4.
We will express such a welfare sharing game by the tuple G = {N,R, {Ai}i∈N , f, {vr}r∈R} and
drop the subscripts on the above sets, e.g., denote {vr}r∈R as simply {vr}, for brevity.
The goal of this paper is to derive the distribution rule f that optimizes the performance
of the emergent collective behavior. Here, we focus on the concept of pure Nash equilibrium
as a model for this emergent collective behavior [29]. A pure Nash equilibrium, which we will
henceforth refer to as just an equilibrium, is defined as an allocation ane ∈ A such that for all
i ∈ N and for all ai ∈ Ai, we have
Ui(a
ne
i , a
ne
−i) ≥ Ui(ai, ane−i).
In essence, an equilibrium represents an allocation for which no single agent has a unilateral
incentive to alter its covering choice given the choices of the other agents. It is important to
highlight that an equilibrium might not exist in a general game G. Nevertheless, when restricting
attention to the class of games with utility functions defined in (1), an equilibrium is guaranteed
to exist as the resulting game is known to be a congestion game [28].5
We will measure the efficiency of an equilibrium allocation in a game G through two com-
monly studied measures, termed price of anarchy and price of stability, defined as follows:
PoA(G) = min
ane∈G
W (ane)
W (aopt)
≤ 1,
PoS(G) = max
ane∈G
W (ane)
W (aopt)
≤ 1,
where we use the notation ane ∈ G to imply an equilibrium of the game G. In words, the price of
anarchy characterizes the performance of the worst equilibrium of G relative to the performance
of the optimal allocation, while the price of stability focuses on the best equilibrium in the game
G. Such distinction is required as equilibria are guaranteed to exists for the class of utilities
considered in (1), but in general they are not unique. By definition 0 ≤ PoA(G) ≤ PoS(G) ≤ 1.
Throughout, we require that a system designer commits to a distribution rule without explicit
knowledge of the agent set N , resource set R, action sets {Ai}, and resource valuations {vr}.
Note that once a particular distribution rule f has been chosen, this distribution rule defines a
game for any realization of the parameters. The objective of the system designer is to provide
desirable performance guarantees irrespective of the realization of these parameter, even if they
where chosen by an adversary. To that end, let Gf denote the family of games induced by a given
distribution rule f , i.e., any game G ∈ Gf is of the above form. We will measure the quality of
a distribution rule f by a worst-case analysis over the set of induced games Gf , which is the
natural extension of the price of anarchy and price of stability defined above, i.e.,
PoA(Gf ) = min
G∈Gf
PoA(G), (2)
PoS(Gf ) = min
G∈Gf
PoS(G). (3)
4 A different and apparently less restrictive choice might entail assigning different distribution rules to different
players. However, given the anonymity and symmetry with which players’ decisions enter in the welfare function
W , working in this larger set of admissible utility functions will not improve the best achievable performance.
For this reason, in the following we focus on utility functions of the form (1).
5 There is a rich body of literature that provides distributed decision-making mechanisms that ensures the
emergent collective behavior will reach an equilibrium for the class of games considered in this paper [34, 35,
12, 22, 27]. However, we will not discuss such results due to space considerations.
The price of anarchy PoA(Gf ) for a given distribution rule f provides a bound on the quality
of any equilibrium irrespective of the agent set N , resource set R, action sets {Ai}, and re-
source valuations {vr}. The price of stability, on the other hand, provides similar performance
guarantees when restricting attention to the best equilibrium.6
The goal of this paper is to investigate the design of distribution rules that optimize the
metrics introduced in (2) and (3). A natural question is whether the locality requirement spec-
ified in the agents’ utility functions in (1) is detrimental from a performance perspective. To
address this question, suppose that a system designer was able to directly set each agent’s utility
function as the global welfare, i.e., Ui(a) = W (a), which clearly violates our locality condition.
It is fairly straightforward to show that the price of anarchy associated with this design choice
is 0.5. As we will see in the ensuing section, there are alternative utility designs conforming to
(1) that guarantee a better price of anarchy than 0.5. Hence, while setting Ui(a) = W (a) might
seem a natural choice to optimize the price of anarchy, there are alternative choices that are
local and yield far better results.
3 The Trade-off Between the Price of Stability and Price of Anarchy
In this section we provide our first main result that characterizes the inherent tension between
the price of anarchy and price of stability as design objectives in multiagent covering problems.
Recall that Gf is the set of set covering games induced by a given distribution rule f . We now
introduce a subset of these games that impose constraints on the maximum number of agents
that could select a single resource. More formally, let Gkf ⊆ Gf , k ≥ 1, denote the family of games
where at most k agents can select any single resource, i.e. G = {N,R, {Ai}, f, {vr}} ∈ Gkf if
maxa∈A, r∈R |a|r ≤ k. We will refer to the games Gkf as games with cardinality k.
Theorem 1. Consider any cardinality k ≥ 1 and desired price of anarchy α satisfying 0 ≤ α ≤
maxf PoA(Gkf ).
(i) For any non-increasing distribution rule f , if PoA(Gkf ) ≥ α, where α ≤ 1/2, then the price
of stability satisfies PoS(Gkf ) ≤ 1.
(ii) For any non-increasing distribution rule f , if PoA(Gkf ) ≥ α, where α > 1/2, then the price
of stability satisfies
PoS(Gkf ) ≤ Zk(α) =
1
1 + maxj≤k (j − 1)(j − 1)!
(
1− ( 1α − 1)∑j−1i=1 1i!). (4)
(iii) The bounds given in Cases (i) and (ii) are tight.
The results of Theorem 1 are illustrated in Figure 1. In particular, Theorem 1-(ii) establishes
that there does not exist a distribution rule f that attains a price of stability and price of
anarchy in the red region of the figure. Hence, there is an inherent tension between these two
measures of efficiency as improving the performance of the worst equilibria necessarily comes at
the expense of the best equilibria, and vice versa. The expression of Zk(α) defines this trade-
off. Theorem 1-(iii) guarantees that the bounds obtained in Cases (i) and (ii) are tight, i.e.,
there are distribution rules that achieve a price of anarchy and price of stability guarantees
that lie exactly on the boundary of the red region. Note that Zk(α) is non-increasing in α and
limk→∞ Zk(1− 1/e) = 1− 1/e.
6 One motivation for studying the price of stability is the availability of distributed learning rules that lead the
collective behavior to the best equilibrium, e.g., [25, 3, 4].
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Z(α)
not achievable
(1− 1
e
, 1− 1
e
)
Worst case performance (PoA)
Best case performance
(PoS)
Fig. 1: Trade-off between anarchy and stability. The figure provides an illustration of
the inherent trade-off between the price of anarchy and price of stability. For simplicity, we
define Z(α) = limk→∞ Zk(α) and illustrate this trade-off in the case of large k. First, note that
the gray region is not achievable since 0 ≤ PoA(Gkf ) ≤ PoS(Gkf ) ≤ 1 by definition. Theorem 1
demonstrates that the red region is also not achievable. That is, there does not exist a dis-
tribution rule with joint price of anarchy and price of stability guarantees in the red region.
For example, if α ≤ 1/2, then a price of stability of 1 is attainable while meeting this price of
anarchy demand. However, if α = 1− 1/e, then a price of stability of 1 is no longer attainable.
In fact, the best attainable price of stability is now also 1− 1/e.
3.1 Supporting Results
Before delving into the proof of Theorem 1, we present two supporting results which will be
essential for the forthcoming proof.
We begin our analysis by strengthening the results in [13] to attain a tight price of anarchy
for any distribution rule f .
Our first result strengthens the findings of [13] to obtain a tight price of anarchy for any
distribution rule f over each set of games Gkf , where k ≥ 1.
Theorem 2. Consider any non-increasing distribution rule f and cardinality k ≥ 1. The price
of anarchy associated with the induced family of games Gkf is
PoA(Gkf ) =
1
1 + χkf
, where (5)
χkf = max
1≤j≤k−1
{j · f(j)− f(j + 1), (k − 1) · f(k)} . (6)
Further, the unique distribution rule maximizing the price of anarchy over the induced games
Gkf is, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k
fkgar(j) = (j − 1)!
(
1
(k−1)(k−1)! +
∑k−1
i=j
1
i!
1
(k−1)(k−1)! +
∑k−1
i=1
1
i!
)
. (7)
The proof can be found in the Appendix. We now shift our attention to the other performance
metric of interest, the price of stability. Our next theorem provides a tight characterization of
the price of stability for any non-increasing distribution rule f .
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1 1 1
2 0 0.418
3 0 0.254
4 0 0.180
5 0 0.139
6 0 0.113
7 0 0.095
8 0 0.082
9 0 0.072
10 0 0.065
Fig. 2: Optimal distribution rules. This figure illustrates the unique distribution rule fkgar
that optimizes the price of anarchy given in Theorem 2 and the unique distribution rule fmc
that optimizes the price of stability given in Theorem 3; k = 10. The corresponding values are
presented in the table.
Theorem 3. Consider any non-increasing distribution rule f and cardinality k ≥ 1. The price
of stability associated with the induced family of games Gkf is
PoS(Gkf ) = min
1≤j≤k
{
1
1 + (j − 1) · f(j)
}
. (8)
The optimal price of stability is maxf PoS(Gkf ) = 1, and the unique distribution rule that
achieves this price of stability over the induced games Gkf is the marginal contribution distribution
rule fmc given by
fmc(k) =
{
1 if k = 1,
0 otherwise.
(9)
The proof is deferred to the Appendix. Figure 2 illustrates the unique distribution rule fkgar
optimizing the price of anarchy in Theorem 2 and the unique distribution rule fmc that optimizes
the price of stability given in Theorem 3.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We will now shift our attention to the proof of Theorem 1. First, observe that χkf defined in (6)
can be equivalently characterized as the solution to the the following optimization problem
χkf = min x
s. t j · f(j)− f(j + 1) ≤ x, 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1,
(k − 1) · f(k) ≤ x.
This allows us to state the following corollary, which will be useful to prove Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Let Fkα, α ∈ (0, 1), denote the family of distribution rules that guarantee a price
of anarchy of at least α in games with cardinality k ≥ 1, i.e.,
Fkα = {f : PoA(Gkf ) ≥ α}.
Then, the set Fkα is uniquely defined by the set of distribution rules f that satisfy the following
k-linear equations,
j · f(j)− f(j + 1) ≤ 1
α
− 1, ∀j ≤ k − 1,
(k − 1)f(k) ≤ 1
α
− 1.
Finally, let us define
PoS(Gk;α) = max
f∈Fkα
PoS(Gkf ) (10)
as the best achievable price of stability given that the price of anarchy is guaranteed to exceed
α, where α ∈ (0, 1).
We will now state an enriched version of Theorem 1 using the notation just introduced, as
this allows for a more precise proof.
Theorem 4. Let k ≥ 1. The function PoS(Gk;α) satisfies the following:
i) For any α ≤ 1/2, PoS(Gk;α) = 1.
ii) For any α satisfying 12 < α ≤ maxf PoA(Gkf ),
PoS(Gk;α) = 1
1 + maxj≤k (j − 1)(j − 1)!
(
1− ( 1α − 1)∑j−1i=1 1i!) . (11)
iii) Lastly, if α = maxf PoA(Gkf ) then
PoS(Gk;α) = max
f
PoA(Gkf ), (12)
and limk→∞ PoS(Gk;α) = 1− 1e .
Proof. i) Consider the marginal contribution distribution rule fmc, defined in (9). It is straight-
forward to verify that χkfmc = 1 and hence fmc ∈ Fkα for any α ≤ 1/2. Further, it is well-known
that PoS(Gkfmc) = 1, see [27]. This completes the first part of the proof.
ii) We shift our attention to the price of stability. From Theorem 3 and (10) we have
PoS(Gk;α) = max
f∈Fkα
min
j≤k
{
1
1 + (j − 1) · f(j)
}
. (13)
The optimization problem in (13) is equivalent to
min
f
max
j≤k
(j − 1) · f(j)
s.t. j · f(j)−
(
1
α
− 1
)
≤ f(j + 1), ∀j ≤ k − 1,
(k − 1)f(k) ≤
(
1
α
− 1
)
.
We find an optimal solution by first solving for the distribution rule that satisfies the k − 1
linear inequalities with equality, followed by verifying that the resulting distribution rule is non
increasing. Such distribution rule can be computed recursively, and is of the form
f(j) = max
{
(j − 1)!
(
1−
(
1
α
− 1
) j−1∑
i=1
1
i!
)
, 0
}
.
Using Theorem 3 on such distribution rule, gives the desired result in (11).
iii) The final result can be proven as follows: replace α in (11) with the optimal price of
anarchy from [13, Corollary 1], i.e., set
α = 1− 1
1
(k−1)(k−1)! +
∑k−1
i=1
1
i!
.
After some manipulation,
PoS(Gk;α) =
1
(k−1)(k−1)! +
∑k−1
i=1
1
i!
1
(k−1)(k−1)! +
∑k−1
i=0
1
i!
= max
f
PoA(Gkf ) ,
proving the claim in (12). Taking the limit k → ∞ in the previous expression, gives the final
result.
4 Using Information to Breach the Anarchy/Stability Frontier
The previous section highlights a fundamental tension between the price of stability and price
of anarchy for the given covering problem when restricted to local agent objective functions of
the form (1). In this section, we challenge the role of locality in these fundamental trade-offs.
That is, we show how to move beyond the price of anarchy / price of stability frontier given in
Theorem 1 if we allow the agents to condition their choice on a higher degree of system-level
information.
With this goal in mind, we introduce a minimal and easily attainable piece of system-level
information that can permit the realization of decision-making rules with efficiency guarantees
beyond this frontier. To that end, for each allocation a ∈ A we define the information flow graph
(V,E) where each node of the graph represents an agent and we construct a directed edge i→ j
if ai ∈ Aj for i 6= j (no self loops). Based on this allocation-dependent graph, we define for each
agent i the set Ni(a) ⊆ N consisting of all the agents that can reach i through a path in the
graph (V,E). Similarly, for each agent i we define
Qi(a) = (∪j∈Ni(a)Aj) ∪ Ai, (14)
which consists of the union of Ai and all the sets of other agents that can reach i through a
path in the graph. An example is shown in Figure 3.
Agent i Ni(a) Qi(a)
1 {2, 3, 4} A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A3 ∪ A4
2 {3, 4} A2 ∪ A3 ∪ A4
3 {2, 4} A2 ∪ A3 ∪ A4
4 {2, 3} A2 ∪ A3 ∪ A4
5 ∅ A5
Fig. 3: Example of graph (V,E). The sets Ni(a) and Qi(a) are enumerated for each agent
in the table on the right. Observe that the graph (V,E) as well as the sets Ni(a) and Qi(a) are
allocation dependent.
Building upon this graph we define the following quantities:
Vi(a) = max
r∈Ai\a−i
vr, (15)
xi(a) = max
r∈Qi(a)\a
vr. (16)
The term Vi(a) captures the highest valued resource in agent i’s choice set Ai that is not covered
by any agent. If the set Ai \ a−i is empty, we set Vi(a) = 0. Similarly, the term xi(a) captures
the highest-valued resource in the enlarged set Qi(a) not currently covered by any other agent.
If the set Qi(a) \ a is empty, we set xi(a) = 0.
We are now ready to specify the information based game. As before, we have a set of agents
N and each agent has an action set Ai ⊆ R. Here, we consider a state-based distribution rule
that toggles between the two extreme optimal distribution rules: Gairing’s rule and the marginal
contribution rule. More formally, the distribution rule for agent i is now of the form
fki (ai = r, a−i) =
{
fmc(|a|r) if Vi(a) ≥ xi(a),
fkgar(|a|r) otherwise,
(17)
and the corresponding utilities are given by Ui(ai = r, a−i) = vr · fki (a), as we allow the system-
level information xi(a) and Vi(a) to prescribe which distribution rule each agent applies. We
denote with fksb = {fki }i∈N the collection of distribution rules in (17) and informally refer to it
as to the state-based distribution rule.7
The next theorem demonstrates how fksb attains performance guarantees beyond the price
of stability / price of anarchy frontier established in Theorem 1.
Theorem 5. Consider any cardinality k ≥ 1 and let fksb = {fki }, where fki is defined in (17).
First, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in any game G ∈ Gk
fksb
. Furthermore, the price of
anarchy and price of stability associated with the induced family of games Gk
fksb
is
PoS(Gk
fksb
) =1,
PoA(Gk
fksb
) = max
f
PoA(Gkf ).
The proof is postponed to the Appendix. We remark on Theorem 5 for the case when k →∞
for ease of exposition. Note that for this case, a consequence of attaining a price of anarchy of
1−1/e was a price of stability also of 1−1/e and this was achieved by fgar defined in (7). Using
the state-based rule given in (17), a system designer can achieve the optimal price of anarchy
without any consequences for the price of stability. Hence, the identified piece of system-level
information was crucial for moving beyond the inherited performance limitations by adhering
to our notion of local information. Whether alternative forms of system-level information could
move us beyond these guarantees, or achieve these guarantees with less information, is an open
research question.
5 Conclusions
How should a system operator design a networked architecture? The answer to this question
is non-trivial and involves weighing the advantages and disadvantages associated with different
design choices. In this paper we highlight one novel trade-off pertaining to the price of anarchy
and price of stability in set covering problems with local information. Further, we demonstrate
how a system designer can move beyond these limitations by equipping the agents with addi-
tional information about the system. Fully realizing the potential of multiagent systems requires
to pursue a more formal understanding of the inherent limitations and performance trade-offs
associated with networked architectures. While this paper focused purely on two performance
measures, other metrics of interest include convergence rates, robustness to adversaries, fairness,
among others. In each of these settings, it is imperative that a system operator fully understands
the role of information within these trade-offs. Only then, will a system operator be able to ef-
fectively balance the potential performance gains with the communication costs associated with
propagating additional information through the system.
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2
The distribution rule maximizing the price of anarchy and the corresponding optimal value are
derived in [13] by means of a different approach. Thus, in the following we only show the tight
bound of (5).
Proof. For any non increasing distribution rule, [13] proves that the price of anarchy satisfies
PoA(Gkf ) ≥ 11+χkf . We will show that PoA(G
k
f ) ≤ 11+χkf holds too, which will complete the proof.
To do so, note that by definition
χkf = max
1≤j≤k−1
{j · f(j)− f(j + 1), (k − 1) · f(k)}.
Hence, we can distinguish two cases. For each of them we will construct an instance of covering
game that achieves PoA(Gkf ) = 11+χkf , thus completing the proof.
i) χkf = j · f(j)− f(j + 1) for some 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1.
First, suppose f(j) > f(j + 1) and define γ = f(j + 1)/f(j) < 1. Consider the instance
given in Figure 4, where there are j agents at each of the m+ 1 levels (m > 0). Each agent
 0f(j)
 0f(j)
 0f(j)
 0f(j)
 0
 1f(j)
 1f(j)
 1f(j)
 1
 mf(j)
 mf(j)
 mf(j)
 m
Level 0 Level 1 . . . Level m
  = f(j+1)f(j)
Fig. 4: First instance used in case i).
is represented by a solid line and the circles at either end of the line indicate the choices
available to that agent. In particular, in Level 0 there are j agents and j + 1 resources of
which j valued at γ0f(j) and a single one valued at γ0. At each subsequent level k > 0,
there are j agents and j resources of which j−1 valued at γkf(j) and a single one valued at
γk. Further, at each level k > 0 one of the agents can choose between the common element
at level k or the common at level k − 1. The equilibrium allocation ane consists of all the
agents selecting the common resource to their right in Figure 4. This produces a welfare of
W (ane) = 1 + γ + · · ·+ γm = 1−γm+11−γ , which in the limit of m→∞ reduces to
W∞(ane) =
1
1− γ .
The optimal allocation aopt covers all resources, except one of those valued γmf(j), yielding
a total welfare of W (aopt) = W (ane) +W (ane)(j− 1)f(j) + f(j)(1− γm), which in the limit
of m→∞ reduces to
W∞(aopt) =W∞(ane)(1 + (j − 1)f(j)) + f(j)
=W∞(ane)(1 + jf(j)− f(j + 1))
=W∞(ane)(1 + χkf ) ,
from which the desired result follows: W∞(a
ne)
W∞(aopt) =
1
1+χkf
.
Now, suppose f(j) = f(j+1). Consider the instance given in Figure 5, consisting of j agents
and j + 1 resources, one of them valued at 1 and j − 1 valued at f(j). One equilibrium
allocation ane consists of all the agents selecting the resource to their right, producing a
welfare of W (ane) = 1. On the other hand, the optimum yields W (aopt) = (j− 1)f(j) + 1 =
(jf(j)− f(j + 1) + 1) = χkf + 1, and hence W (a
ne)
W (aopt) =
1
1+χkf
.
 0f(j)
 0f(j)
 0f(j)
 0f(j)
 0
 1f(j)
 1f(j)
 1f(j)
 1
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 mf(j)
 mf(j)
 m
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  = f(j+1)f(j)
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f(j)
f(j)
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1
Fig. 5: Second instance used in case i).
ii) χkf = (k − 1)f(k). The second instance discussed in the previous case applies here as well,
with j = k. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
The distribution rule maximizing the price of stability and the corresponding optimal value are
trivial to obtain, once the result in (8) is proven. Before proceeding with showing the latter, we
observe that we can restrict our attention to games G ∈ Gkf where there is an optimal allocation
that is disjoint, i.e., there is an optimal allocation aopt such that aopti 6= aoptj for any i 6= j. The
following claim, stated without proof, formalizes this observation.
Claim. Let G¯kf ⊆ Gkf be the set of games where each game G ∈ G¯kf has an optimal allocation
that is disjoint. The price of stability and price of anarchy satisfy
PoA(G¯kf ) = PoA(Gkf ),
PoS(G¯kf ) = PoS(Gkf ).
Throughout the remainder of the proof, we will concentrate on games that possess an optimal
allocation that is disjoint. We will continue to denote the game set as Gkf as opposed to G¯kf for
ease of presentation.
We will prove the above price of stability result through a series of intermediate claims.
A central piece of the forthcoming analysis is the focus on a particular sequence of allocations
a0, a1, . . . , am derived from a series of unilateral deviations of players switching from their choice
in the equilibrium allocation to their choice in the optimal allocation. We begin by observing
that any game G in the class Gkf is a congestion game, and thus is a potential game as introduced
in [28], with a potential function φ : A → R of the form8
φ(a) =
∑
r∈R
|a|r∑
j=1
vr · f(j). (18)
It is well-known that an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in any potential game [28], and
one such equilibrium is the allocation that optimizes the potential function φ, i.e., ane ∈
arg maxa∈A φ(a). Focusing on this specific equilibrium, we consider a sequence of allocations
taking the form a0 = ane and ak = (aopti(k), a
k−1
−i(k)) for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} where i(k) is the devi-
ating player in the k-th profile. The selection of the deviating players I = {i(1), . . . , i(m)} is
chosen according to the following rules:
(i) Let i(1) ∈ N be any arbitrary player.
(ii) For each k ≥ 1, if aopti(k) = anei (1) or aopti(k) /∈ ane then the sequence is terminated.
(iii) Otherwise, let i(k + 1) be any agent in the set {j ∈ N : akj = aopti(k)} and repeat.
Claim. Define Q = ∪i∈I anei and Q¯ = ∪i∈I aopti . Then∑
i∈I
Ui(a
ne) ≥
∑
r∈Q∩Q¯
vrf(|ane|r) +
∑
r∈Q¯\Q
vr. (19)
Proof. We begin with two observations on the above sequence of allocations: (a) the sequence of
allocations can continue at most n steps due to the disjointness of aopt and (b) if the sequence
continues, it must be that for player i(k + 1) anei(k+1) = a
opt
i(k). Observation (b) ensures us that
m−1∑
k=1
Ui(k+1)(a
k)− Ui(k)(ak) = 0. (20)
Accordingly, we have that
φ(a0)− φ(am) =
m−1∑
k=0
φ(ak)− φ(ak+1)
=
m−1∑
k=0
Ui(k+1)(a
k)− Ui(k+1)(ak+1)
= Ui(1)(a
0)− Ui(m)(am) +
+
m−1∑
k=1
Ui(k+1)(a
k)− Ui(k)(ak)
= Ui(1)(a
0)− Ui(m)(am) ≥ 0 .
The first and third equalities follow by rearranging the terms. The second equality can be shown
using the definition of φ as in (18); the last equality follows by (20). The inequality derives from
the fact that a0 = ane optimizes the potential function. Thanks to observation (b), one can
show that
Q \ Q¯ = anei(1) \ aopti(m) and Q¯ \Q = aopti(m) \ anei(1) .
8 A proof of this can be found in [28], where the potential function φ is also defined.
If Q \ Q¯ 6= ∅, it must be that anei(1) 6= aopti(m) so that Q \ Q¯ = anei(1) and Q¯ \ Q = aopti(m) . Using
anei(1) 6= aopti(m) in condition (ii), tells us that aopti(m) /∈ ane and thus the resource aopti(m) is not chosen
by anyone else in the allocation am. Thus, when Q \ Q¯ 6= ∅,
Ui(1)(a
0)− Ui(m)(am) =
∑
r∈Q\Q¯
vrf(|ane|r)−
∑
r∈Q¯\Q
vr ≥ 0. (21)
When Q \ Q¯ = ∅, also Q¯ \Q = ∅ and thus the previous inequality still holds. Rearranging the
terms and adding
∑
r∈Q∩Q¯ vrf(|ane|r) to each side gives us∑
r∈Q
vrf(|ane|r) ≥
∑
r∈Q∩Q¯
vrf(|ane|r) +
∑
r∈Q¯\Q
vr . (22)
Finally note that ∑
i∈I
Ui(a
ne) ≥
∑
r∈Q
vrf(|ane|r)
which together with (22) completes the proof.
Our second claim shows that there exist a collection of disjoint sequences that covers all
players in N . We will express a sequence merely by the deviating player set I with the under-
standing that this set uniquely determines the sequence of allocations.
Claim. There exists a collection of deviating players I1, . . . , Ip chosen according the process
described above such that ∪k Ik = N and Ij ∩ Ik = ∅ for any j 6= k.
Proof. Suppose I1, I2, . . . , Ik represent the first k sequences of deviating players. Further as-
sume that they are all disjoint. Choose some player i ∈ N \∪kIk to start the (k+1)-th sequence.
If no such player exists, we are done. Otherwise, construct the sequence according to the pro-
cess depicted above. If the sequence terminates without selecting a player in ∪kIk, then repeat
this process to generate the (k + 2)-th sequence. Otherwise, let ik+1(j), j ≥ 2, denote the first
player in the (k + 1)-th sequence contained in the set ∪kIk. Since aopti 6= aoptj (for i 6= j),
this player must be contained in the set ∪kik(1), i.e., the first player in a previous sequence.
Suppose this player is i`(1), where ` ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If this is the case, replace the `-th sequence
with {ik+1(1), . . . , ik+1(j − 1), I`} which is a valid sequence and disjoint from the others. Then
repeat the process above to choose the (k+ 1)-th sequence. Note that this process can continue
at most n-steps and will always result in a collection of disjoint sequences that cover all players
in N . This completes the proof.
In the following we complete the proof of Theorem 3, by means of Claims A and A.
Proof. We being showing a lower bound on the price of stability. Let I1, . . . , Ip denote a col-
lection of deviating players that satisfies Claim A. Further, let Qk and Q¯k be defined as above
for each sequence k = 1, . . . , p. Using the result (19) from Claim A, we have
∑
i∈N
Ui(a
ne) =
p∑
k=1
∑
i∈Ik
Ui(a
ne)
≥
p∑
k=1
 ∑
r∈Qk∩Q¯k
vrf(|ane|r) +
∑
r∈Q¯k\Qk
vr

=
∑
r∈aopt∩ane
vrf(|ane|r) +
∑
r∈aopt\ane
vr,
where the above equality follows from the fact that Q¯i ∩ Q¯j = ∅ for any i 6= j which is due to
the disjointness of aopt. Using the definition of Ui(a
ne), we have∑
r∈ane\aopt
vr|ane|rf(|ane|r) +
∑
r∈ane∩aopt
vr (|ane|r − 1) f(|ane|r) ≥
∑
r∈aopt\ane
vr.
Define γ = maxj≤n(j − 1)f(j). Working with the above expression we have∑
r∈ane\aopt
vr(γ + 1) +
∑
r∈ane∩aopt
vrγ ≥
∑
r∈aopt\ane
vr,
which gives us that
(γ + 1)W (ane) ≥W (aopt)
which completes the lower bound.
We will now provide an accompanying upper bound on the price of stability. To that end,
consider a family of examples parameterized by a coefficient j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. For each j, the game
consists of j agents and (j + 1)-resources R = {r0, r1, . . . , rj} where the values of the resources
are vr0 = 1 and vr1 = · · · = vrj = f(j) − ε where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant, and
the action set of each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , j} is Ai = {r0, ri}. The unique equilibrium is of the
form ane = (r0, . . . , r0) as every agent selects resource r0 and the total welfare is W (a
ne) = 1.
The optimal allocation is of the form aopt = (r0, r2, . . . , rj) which generates a total welfare of
W (aopt) = 1 + (j − 1)(f(j)− ε). Performing a worst case analysis over ε and j gives
PoS(Gf ) ≤ min
1≤j≤k
{
1
1 + (j − 1) · f(j)
}
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof of PoS result We begin our proof with a lemma that identifies a structure about the
state based distribution rule {fki }.
Lemma 1. Let a be any allocation. Then for each agent i ∈ N , one of the following two
statements is true.
- Ui(a
′
i = r, a−i) = vr · fmc(|a−i|+ 1), ∀a′i ∈ Ai; or
- Ui(a
′
i = r, a−i) = vr · fgar(|a−i|+ 1), ∀a′i ∈ Ai.
Informally, this lemma states that for a given allocation a, the state based distribution rule
will either evaluate every resource at the marginal contribution distribution or every resource
at the Gairing distribution rule for a given agent i.
Proof. Let a be any allocation and i be any agent. Extend the definition of xi(a) in (16) as
yi(a) = max
r∈(Qi(a)\a)∩Ai
vr, (23)
zi(a) = max
r∈(Qi(a)\a)\Ai
vr, (24)
and note that xi(a) = max{yi(a), zi(a)}. First observe that for any a′i ∈ Ai: (i) yi(a) ≤ Vi(a);
(ii) zi(a) = zi(a
′
i, a−i); and (iii) Vi(a) = Vi(a
′
i, a−i). Accordingly, xi(a) > Vi(a) if and only if
xi(a) = zi(a). Consequently, xi(a) > Vi(a) if and only if xi(a
′
i, a−i) > Vi(a
′
i, a−i) which completes
the proof.
We will now prove that an equilibrium exists and the price of stability is 1. In particular,
we will show that the optimal allocation aopt is in fact an equilibrium.
Proof. Let aopt be an optimal allocation. We begin by showing that Vi(a
opt) ≥ xi(aopt) for all i ∈
N . Suppose this was not the case, and there exists an agent i such that Vi(a
opt) < xi(a
opt). This
implies that there exists a resource r ∈ Qi(aopt) \ aopt such that vr > vr˜ = maxr0∈Ai:|aopt−i |=0 vr0 .
By definition of Qi(a) and Ni(a) there exists a sequence of players {i0, i1, . . . , im} such that
aoptik ∈ Aik−1 for all k ≥ 1, and r ∈ Aim . Hence, consider a new allocation where aik = a
opt
ik+1
for all k ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} and aim = r, where aj = aoptj for all other agents j /∈ {i0, i1, . . . , im}.
The welfare of this allocation is W (a) ≥ W (aopt) + vr − vr˜ > W (aopt), which contradicts the
optimality of aopt. This means that every agent will be using the marginal cost distribution rule
to evaluate its utility in the allocation aopt.
Now, suppose aopt is not an equilibrium for sake of contradiction. This means, that there
exists an agent i with an action ai ∈ A such that Ui(ai, aopt−i ) > Ui(aopt). Since agents are using
the marginal contribution distribution rule, which follows from Vi(a
opt) ≥ xi(aopt), we have
W (ai, a
opt
−i ) = W (a
opt)− Ui(aopt) + Ui(ai, aopt−i ) > W (aopt),
which contradicts the optimality of aopt. This completes the proof.
Informal discussion and proof of PoA result Consider a gameG = (N,R, {Ai}, {fki }, {vr})
with cardinality bounded by k. Let ane be any equilibrium of the game G. A crucial part of the
forthcoming analysis will center on a new game G′ derived from the original game G and the
equilibrium ane, i.e.,
(G, ane) −→ G′.
This new game G′ possesses the identical player set, resource set, and valuations of the resources
as the game G. The difference between the games are (i) the action sets and (ii) the new game
G′ employs the Gairing distribution rule, fkgar, as opposed to the state-based distribution rule
fksb. Informally, the proof proceeds in the following two steps:
– Step 1: We prove that the equilibrium ane of G is also an equilibrium of G′. Since the player
set, resource set, and valuations of the resources are unchanged we have that
W (ane;G′) = W (ane;G),
where we write the notation W (ane;G′) to mean the welfare accrued at the allocation ane in
the game G′.
– Step 2: We show that the optimal allocation aopt
′
in the new game G′ is at least as good as
the optimal allocation in the original game G′, i.e.,
W (aopt
′
;G′) ≥W (aopt;G).
Combining the results from Step 1 and Step 2 give us
W (ane;G)
W (aopt;G)
≥ W (a
ne;G′)
W (aopt′ ;G′)
≥ PoA(Gkfkgar),
where the last inequality follows from Theorem 2 since G′ employs fkgar.
Construction of game G′: We will now provide the construction of the new game G′ from
the game G and the equilibrium ane. We begin with some notation that we will use to construct
the new agents’ action sets in the game G′. For each i ∈ N , let ri = anei and define
Hi = {r ∈ Ai : vri · fkgar(|ane|ri) < vr · fkgar(1 + |ane−i|r)}, (25)
to be the set of resources that will give a strictly better payoff to agent i if the agent was to use
fkgar instead of f
k
sb. Further, denote
I = {i ∈ N : Hi 6= ∅}, (26)
as the set of agents that would move from the equilibrium ane if they were to use fkgar instead
of fksb. Finally, for each agent i ∈ I, let
Bi = {r′ ∈ Qi(ane) : |ane|r′ = 0} , (27)
i.e. the enlarged set of resources of (14) that are not chosen by anyone at equilibrium.
We are now ready to construct the new game G′. As noted above, the agent set, resource
set, and resource valuations are identical to those in G. The new action set of each agent i in
game G′ is defined as
A′i =
{
(Ai\Hi) ∪Bi ∪ ∅ if i ∈ I ,
Ai otherwise .
Lastly, the utility functions of the agents are derived using fkgar. We denote this game G
′ by the
tuple G′ = (N,R, {A′i}, fkgar, {vr}).
Formal Proof of Step 1:
Proof. In the first part of the proof, we will establish that the equilibrium allocation ane of
game G is also an equilibrium allocation of game G′. By definition of the action sets {A′i}, we
know that anei ∈ A′i for all agents i ∈ N . It remains to show that for any agent i ∈ N
Ui(a
ne
i , a
ne
−i;G
′) ≥ Ui(a′i, ane−i;G′), ∀a′i ∈ A′i, (28)
where we use the notation Ui(a;G
′) to denote the utility of agent i for allocation a in the game
G′.
Based on the above definition of the action sets {A′i}, we only need to concentrate our
attention on agents i ∈ I with choices a′i ∈ Bi, as (28) follows immediately in the other cases.
Since ane is an equilibrium of game G, then by Lemma 1 we know that each agent i ∈ I employs
the marginal contribution distribution rule everywhere. Accordingly, we have
Ui(a
ne
i , a
ne
−i;G) = max
r∈Ai\ane−i
vr = Vi(a
ne) ≥ xi(ane), (29)
where the first equality follows from the equilibrium conditions coupled with the use of the
marginal contribution distribution rule and the inequality follows from the use of the marginal
contribution distribution rule and (17).
We will conclude the proof by a case study on the potential values of Ui(a
ne
i , a
ne
−i;G). For
brevity in the forthcoming arguments we let r = anei .
– Case (i): Suppose Ui(a
ne
i , a
ne
−i;G) = 0. In this case, we have that xi(a
ne) = 0 from (29) which
implies that any resource r′ ∈ Bi has value vr′ = 0. Hence, Ui(anei , ane−i;G′) = Ui(r′, ane−i;G′) = 0
and we are done.
– Case (ii): Suppose Ui(a
ne
i , a
ne
−i;G) > 0. Based on the definition of the marginal cost distribution
rule, this implies that |ane|r = 1, and hence
Ui(a
ne;G) = vrfmc(|ane|r) = vrfkgar(|ane|r) = Ui(ane;G′),
which follows from the fact that fmc(1) = f
k
gar(1) = 1. Hence, Ui(a
ne;G′) = vr. For any r′ ∈ Bi,
we have
Ui(r
′, anei ;G
′) = vr′fkgar(1 + |ane−i|r′) = vr′ ≤ xi(ane),
where the last inequality follows for the definition of xi(a
ne). Combining with (29) gives us
Ui(a
ne
i , a
ne
−i;G
′) ≥ Ui(r′, ane−i;G′),
which completes the proof.
Formal Proof of Step 2: We begin with a lemma that highlights a structure associated with
the action sets {A′i} in the new constructed game G′.
Lemma 2. If r ∈ A′i \Ai for some agent i ∈ N and resource r ∈ R, then there exists an agent
j 6= i such that anej = r and consequently r ∈ A′j.
Proof. Suppose r ∈ A′i\Ai for some agent i ∈ N and resource r ∈ R. Then, r ∈ Hi by definition
of the set A′i. By Lemma 1, each agent must either be a marginal contribution agent, i.e., uses
fmc at all resources, or a Gairing agent, i.e., uses fgar at all resources. Since, i ∈ I and ane is
an equilibrium, agent i must be a marginal contribution agent, i.e.,
Ui(a
ne
i = r˜, a
ne
−i) = vr˜ · fmc(|ane|r˜) ≥ vr · fmc(|ane−i|r + 1),
where the inequality follows from the equilibrium conditions. Suppose by contradiction that
|ane−i|r = 0. In this case we have
vr · fmc(|ane−i|r + 1) = vr · fgar(|ane−i|r + 1).
which follows from the fact that fmc(1) = fgar(1) = 1. Since fgar(k) ≥ fmc(k) for all k ≥ 1, this
implies
vr˜ · fgar(|ane|r˜) ≥ vr˜ · fmc(|ane|r˜) ≥ vr · fgar(|ane−i|r + 1).
Hence, r /∈ Hi leading to the contradiction. This completes the proof.
We exploit the result of Lemma 2 to prove Step 2.
Proof. We conclude the proof by constructing an allocation a ∈ A′ that satisfies W (a;G′) =
W (aopt;G) where aopt ∈ arg maxa∈AW (a;G). We begin with an initial allocation a where for
each agent i ∈ N
a =
{
aopti if a
opt
i ∈ A′i ,
∅ else ,
That is, we assign each agent the agent’s optimal allocation choice if it is available to them in
the new action set A′i. If all agents received their optimal choice, then the proof is complete.
If this is not the case, then there will be a set of uncovered resources U(a) = {r ∈ aopt :
|a|r = 0} which we denote by U(a) = {r1, . . . , rm}. We will now argue that we can construct a
new allocation a′ that covers one additional resource from the set U(a), i.e., |U(a′)| = |U(a)|−1
and a ⊆ a′, where we denote with |U(a)| the cardinality of U(a).
To that end, consider any uncovered resource r0 ∈ U(a). By definition, there exists an agent
i0 ∈ N such that aopti0 = r0 but r0 /∈ A′i0 . Consequently, we have that r0 ∈ Hi0 and by Lemma 2
we know that there exists an agent i1 6= i0 such that anei1 = r0. Since anei1 = r0 we also have that
r0 ∈ A′i1 by definition. We now analyze the following three cases:
– Case 1: Suppose ai1 = ∅. Then define a new allocation a′i1 = r0 and a′j = aj for all j 6= i1, and
we are done.
– Case 2: Suppose ai1 = r1 and |ane|r1 = 0, meaning that there are no agents at the resource r1
in the equilibrium allocation. Then by definition r1 ∈ Bi0 and r1 ∈ A′i0 . Define the allocation
a′i0 = r1, a
′
i1
= r0, and a
′
j = aj for all j 6= i0, i1 and we are done.
– Case 3: Suppose ai1 = r1 and |ane|r1 > 0, meaning that there are agents at the resource r1 in
the equilibrium allocation. Select any agent i2 such that a
ne
i2
= r1.
(i) If ai2 = ∅, then consider the allocation a′i1 = r0, a′i2 = r1 and a′j = aj for all j 6= i1, i2 and
we are done.
(ii) Otherwise, if ai2 = r2, then let a
′
i1
= r0, a
′
i2
= r1, and repeat Case 2 or Case 3 depending on
whether |ane|r2 = 0 or |ane|r2 > 0. Note that Case 3-(ii) can be repeated at most n iterations
until an alternative case that terminates is reached. To see this, note that each time an
agent is given a new choice in this process, i.e., ai → a′i 6= ai, the agent’s new choice is the
agent’s equilibrium choice, i.e., a′i = a
ne
i . Therefore, once an agent is assigned a new choice,
the agent will never be reassigned in this process.
Starting from a as defined above, the above process results in a new allocation a′ that
satisfies |U(a′)| = |U(a)| − 1 and a ⊆ a′. As with the allocation a, the allocation a′ satisfies
maxr |a′|r = 1 and a′ ⊆ aopt. If a′ = aopt, we are done. Otherwise, we can repeat the process
depicted above to generate a new allocation a′′ such that |U(a′′)| = |U(a′)|−1 as nowhere in the
process did we rely on the fact that ai = a
opt
i . Repeating these arguments recursively provides
the result.
